code-review
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 7, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill's workflow explicitly targets and reads sensitive file paths, including
auth/directories, authentication middleware, and files with.pemor.keyextensions. These files are processed viagit difforgit showand their contents are passed to sub-agents, exposing potentially sensitive credentials or secrets.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from git repositories (commit messages and diffs) and interpolates them into sub-agent prompts.\n - Ingestion points: Data enters the context from
git diffoutput,git logcommit messages, and repository file contents.\n - Boundary markers: The skill uses Markdown headers (e.g.,
## Diff) to separate data, but lacks robust delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the ingested content.\n - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
Bashfor git operations and theTasktool to trigger autonomous sub-agents (code-reviewerandarchitect-reviewer).\n - Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or filtering of the content within the git diffs or commit messages is performed before being passed to other agents.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing
Bashcommands to interact with the git filesystem. While restricted to a set of read-only git subcommands, this capability is used to extract the untrusted data that powers the workflow.
Audit Metadata