sf-audit
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/pre_score.pyutilizes theimportliblibrary to dynamically load and execute Python modules from computed relative paths. Specifically, it imports validators from sibling skill directories (sf-apex,sf-flow, andsf-lwc). While this is used for orchestration, dynamic loading of code from external paths is a security risk. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection due to its core functionality.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests untrusted metadata directly from the Salesforce org, including Apex class bodies, Flow XML definitions, and validation rule formulas, via the Tooling API and SOQL queries.
- Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or protective instructions provided to the agent to distinguish between metadata content and its own instructions during the scoring phase.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities, including executing shell scripts (
scripts/extract_data.sh), running Python orchestrators, and performing broad filesystem writes within theaudit_outputdirectory. - Sanitization: The retrieved metadata is not sanitized or escaped before being presented to the scoring logic.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill automates complex data extraction by executing an included shell script (
scripts/extract_data.sh). This script performs numerous subprocess calls to the Salesforce CLI (sf) and handles data returned from the org, which is then processed by Python logic.
Audit Metadata