sf-audit

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/pre_score.py utilizes the importlib library to dynamically load and execute Python modules from computed relative paths. Specifically, it imports validators from sibling skill directories (sf-apex, sf-flow, and sf-lwc). While this is used for orchestration, dynamic loading of code from external paths is a security risk.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection due to its core functionality.
  • Ingestion points: The skill ingests untrusted metadata directly from the Salesforce org, including Apex class bodies, Flow XML definitions, and validation rule formulas, via the Tooling API and SOQL queries.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or protective instructions provided to the agent to distinguish between metadata content and its own instructions during the scoring phase.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities, including executing shell scripts (scripts/extract_data.sh), running Python orchestrators, and performing broad filesystem writes within the audit_output directory.
  • Sanitization: The retrieved metadata is not sanitized or escaped before being presented to the scoring logic.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill automates complex data extraction by executing an included shell script (scripts/extract_data.sh). This script performs numerous subprocess calls to the Salesforce CLI (sf) and handles data returned from the org, which is then processed by Python logic.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 22, 2026, 01:03 PM