sf-leads
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to perform environment discovery using shell commands such as
test,command -v,sf, andpython3. These commands are used to determine which "execution mode" the agent is running in and which local tools are available for processing Salesforce data. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation describes execution modes that rely on running local code (Python, shell, jq) for post-processing and report generation. It specifically instructs the agent to locate validation scripts by searching the user's home directory (
find ~/ -name "<script_name>.py") if environment variables likeCLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOTare not set. This represents the execution of scripts from dynamically discovered/computed paths. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external web sources (research findings, LinkedIn profiles) to enrich Salesforce records, which creates a vulnerability surface for malicious instructions embedded in third-party content.
- Ingestion points: External websites, company pages, and LinkedIn profiles as specified in the research workflow in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; no explicit instructions are provided to the agent to treat external content as untrusted or to use delimiters.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
soql_queryfor reading andsobject_dml(via Salesforce MCP tools) for writing data to the CRM. - Sanitization: The skill recommends mapping data to the "org's Industry picklist values" and performing "field-length checks," but lacks comprehensive sanitization for natural language data before it enters the agent's context.
Audit Metadata