sf-metadata

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 29, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/mcp_validator.py uses importlib.util to dynamically load and execute the validate_metadata_operation.py module from a file path constructed at runtime using the __file__ attribute.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: In its cli execution mode, the skill runs shell commands through the Salesforce CLI (sf) to perform bulk metadata retrieval and data queries (e.g., sf data query -q "...").
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted metadata and query results from the target Salesforce org, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection. Maliciously crafted metadata (such as object descriptions) could influence agent behavior during operations like metadata creation or Apex execution.
  • Ingestion points: Org metadata and field structures are retrieved through tools like sobject_describe and tooling_api_query as defined in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions for the agent to use delimiters or ignore embedded instructions within the ingested Salesforce data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can perform sensitive operations including metadata_create, metadata_update, and potentially apex_execute (mapped in references/execution-modes.md).
  • Sanitization: The skill includes a MetadataOperationValidator to check schema and naming conventions, but it does not sanitize natural language fields for potential injection patterns.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 29, 2026, 11:36 AM