sf-metadata
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 29, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/mcp_validator.pyusesimportlib.utilto dynamically load and execute thevalidate_metadata_operation.pymodule from a file path constructed at runtime using the__file__attribute. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: In its
cliexecution mode, the skill runs shell commands through the Salesforce CLI (sf) to perform bulk metadata retrieval and data queries (e.g.,sf data query -q "..."). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted metadata and query results from the target Salesforce org, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection. Maliciously crafted metadata (such as object descriptions) could influence agent behavior during operations like metadata creation or Apex execution.
- Ingestion points: Org metadata and field structures are retrieved through tools like
sobject_describeandtooling_api_queryas defined inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions for the agent to use delimiters or ignore embedded instructions within the ingested Salesforce data.
- Capability inventory: The skill can perform sensitive operations including
metadata_create,metadata_update, and potentiallyapex_execute(mapped inreferences/execution-modes.md). - Sanitization: The skill includes a
MetadataOperationValidatorto check schema and naming conventions, but it does not sanitize natural language fields for potential injection patterns.
Audit Metadata