sf-security
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and analyze untrusted code (Apex, LWC, Aura) and configuration metadata from Salesforce environments, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection if malicious instructions are embedded in the scanned source code.
- Ingestion points: Processes
ApexClass,ApexTrigger,LightningComponentBundle, andAuraDefinitionBundlebodies as described inSKILL.md(Phase 1: Inventory). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when the agent processes the retrieved code snippets.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities including
soql_query,metadata_create,metadata_update, andapex_execute(as defined inreferences/execution-modes.md), which could be targeted by a successful injection. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of the scanned code's content is mentioned prior to processing.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: In
references/execution-modes.md, the skill describes a protocol for 'Artifact download' where it fetches content from anartifactUrland writes it to the local filesystem. This is a standard mechanism for handling large metadata payloads from Salesforce MCP servers. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on several local system commands to function, including the Salesforce CLI (
sf),git(for repo mode), and standard utilities likepython3andjqfor data processing and scoring.
Audit Metadata