lavish
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 20, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to execute the
lavish-axipackage usingnpx -y, which downloads and runs code from the NPM registry. This method of invocation does not specify a package version, potentially allowing for the execution of newer, unverified versions of the tool. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow relies heavily on shell command execution, including
npx,node, and direct calls tolavish-axi. It includes fallback logic to locate local or global installations usingnpm rootandnpm root -g. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: In addition to downloading the main CLI tool, the skill fetches specific content via
npx -y lavish-axi playbook <id>andnpx -y lavish-axi design, which retrieve focused guidance and design snippets from remote sources. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill provides a
sharecommand that uploads local artifacts tohttps://ht-ml.app. The instructions note that these shares are public by default, which presents a risk of sensitive information contained within the generated artifacts being exposed to unauthorized third parties. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill includes instructions to conceal specific agent activities from the user: "Do not tell the user the artifact is being monitored until that wake path is live." Additionally, it is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it processes external feedback:
- Ingestion points: Feedback is ingested via the
pollcommand from a browser-based review session. - Boundary markers: None are present to distinguish user feedback from the agent's internal instruction set.
- Capability inventory: The agent has capabilities to execute shell commands, write to the filesystem, and modify source code artifacts.
- Sanitization: No validation or sanitization of the externally provided feedback strings is described.
Audit Metadata