health
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 7, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses
~/.claude.json, a sensitive configuration file for the Claude CLI that may contain session tokens or credentials. It also implements telemetry logging and an opt-in feature to sync project artifacts (plans, designs, and reports) to a remote GitHub repository. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill automatically extracts and executes the
testscript from the project'spackage.jsonfile. This behavior allows a malicious repository to execute arbitrary code on the user's system when a health check is invoked. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of local binaries and shell scripts (located in
~/.claude/skills/gstack/bin/) to manage project state, track telemetry, and perform repository analysis. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Uses
evaland shellsourceon the output of internal binaries (gstack-slug,gstack-repo-mode) to dynamically configure the environment and influence the agent's behavior. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection. Ingestion points: Untrusted data is read from
package.json,CLAUDE.md, and the output of various external tools (linters, testers). Boundary markers: There are no delimiters or instructions used to prevent the agent from obeying instructions embedded in tool outputs. Capability inventory: The skill usesBashfor command execution, modifies files likeCLAUDE.md, and performsgit commitoperations. Sanitization: No escaping or validation is applied to external content before it is incorporated into the session context.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata