bridge-review
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process data from a "peer agent" via the
agent-bridgetool. This peer output is untrusted and could contain malicious instructions aimed at manipulating the reviewer agent's subsequent actions.\n - Ingestion points: Data received from the peer agent via
agent-bridge(SKILL.md).\n - Boundary markers: No explicit markers or "ignore instructions" directives are implemented to isolate the peer's output.\n
- Capability inventory: The agent has permissions to read/write files and execute shell scripts (SKILL.md).\n
- Sanitization: The skill lacks mechanisms to sanitize or validate the content of the peer review findings before use.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The instructions direct the agent to "write and run temp script" to verify findings. This practice of generating and executing local code based on external input is a security risk.\n
- Evidence: The skill body in
SKILL.mdexplicitly calls for creating and running temporary scripts to validate whether a reported bug is real.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill encourages the agent to "run the test" or "try the input" based on review findings, which involves executing arbitrary shell commands influenced by untrusted data.\n - Evidence: Section 3 ("Verify every finding") in
SKILL.mddescribes these verification methods.
Audit Metadata