skills/kursku/skills/gsd-progress/Gen Agent Trust Hub

gsd-progress

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 1, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Exposure of host environment information through absolute file paths.
  • Evidence: The skill explicitly references C:/Users/nicol/.codex/get-shit-done/workflows/progress.md in the <execution_context> and <process> tags.
  • Impact: This reveals a specific local username ('nicol') and the user's directory structure, which constitutes a minor information disclosure of the execution environment.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect prompt injection surface via externalized execution logic.
  • Ingestion points: The skill instructs the agent to read and execute the workflow defined in C:/Users/nicol/.codex/get-shit-done/workflows/progress.md (referenced in SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or instructions telling the agent to treat the external file's content as data rather than instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill defines mappings that allow external workflows to use spawn_agent and request_user_input tools.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation is applied to the content of the external Markdown file before the agent processes it.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Metadata poisoning through self-authoritative safety claims.
  • Evidence: The YAML frontmatter contains risk: safe.
  • Impact: This is an attempt to override safety evaluations by providing a pre-determined risk level, which can mislead users or automated scanners.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 1, 2026, 12:01 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — gsd-progress