gsd-progress
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Exposure of host environment information through absolute file paths.
- Evidence: The skill explicitly references
C:/Users/nicol/.codex/get-shit-done/workflows/progress.mdin the<execution_context>and<process>tags. - Impact: This reveals a specific local username ('nicol') and the user's directory structure, which constitutes a minor information disclosure of the execution environment.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect prompt injection surface via externalized execution logic.
- Ingestion points: The skill instructs the agent to read and execute the workflow defined in
C:/Users/nicol/.codex/get-shit-done/workflows/progress.md(referenced inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or instructions telling the agent to treat the external file's content as data rather than instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill defines mappings that allow external workflows to use
spawn_agentandrequest_user_inputtools. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation is applied to the content of the external Markdown file before the agent processes it.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Metadata poisoning through self-authoritative safety claims.
- Evidence: The YAML frontmatter contains
risk: safe. - Impact: This is an attempt to override safety evaluations by providing a pre-determined risk level, which can mislead users or automated scanners.
Audit Metadata