iterate-pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its processing of external, untrusted data from GitHub PRs.
- Ingestion points: Pull request feedback is fetched via scripts/fetch_pr_feedback.py and CI status/logs are fetched via scripts/fetch_pr_checks.py.
- Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any boundary markers or delimiters to separate untrusted data from system instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to modify the codebase, execute git push, and post comments back to GitHub via gh api.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the external data before it is processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes several command-line tools to perform its intended functions.
- Evidence: The skill executes gh pr view, git add, git commit, git push, and uses uv run to execute bundled Python scripts for fetching data.
Audit Metadata