generate

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 28, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The vg generate upload <path> command enables the uploading of local files to the Vibedgames backend server. This functional requirement presents a data exfiltration risk if the agent is prompted to upload sensitive files (e.g., configuration files or private keys) from the local filesystem.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process untrusted data from external API endpoints via the models, schema, and docs subcommands, which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context through the stdout of vg generate models, vg generate schema, vg generate status, and vg generate docs (SKILL.md, references/full-reference.md).
  • Boundary markers: None present; the instructions do not include delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded in the API responses.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for subprocess execution (vg generate run), file system writes (--download), and network transmission (upload).
  • Sanitization: There are no documented procedures for sanitizing or validating the JSON/text output received from the remote services.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation recommends installing the vibedgames and @openai/codex packages via npm. While these are associated with the vendor and a well-known service, they represent external dependencies managed at runtime.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary functionality is implemented through the execution of the vg generate CLI tool using various subcommands and flags.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 28, 2026, 12:17 PM