generate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
vg generate upload <path>command enables the uploading of local files to the Vibedgames backend server. This functional requirement presents a data exfiltration risk if the agent is prompted to upload sensitive files (e.g., configuration files or private keys) from the local filesystem. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process untrusted data from external API endpoints via the
models,schema, anddocssubcommands, which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context through the stdout of
vg generate models,vg generate schema,vg generate status, andvg generate docs(SKILL.md, references/full-reference.md). - Boundary markers: None present; the instructions do not include delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded in the API responses.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for subprocess execution (
vg generate run), file system writes (--download), and network transmission (upload). - Sanitization: There are no documented procedures for sanitizing or validating the JSON/text output received from the remote services.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation recommends installing the
vibedgamesand@openai/codexpackages vianpm. While these are associated with the vendor and a well-known service, they represent external dependencies managed at runtime. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary functionality is implemented through the execution of the
vg generateCLI tool using various subcommands and flags.
Audit Metadata