model-catalog

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 28, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to ingest and process untrusted data from users and external sources, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: The skill takes user-provided task descriptions as input for the vg generate models command. Furthermore, the modality reference files (e.g., audio-to-text.md, image-to-image.md) document the use of audio_url, image_url, prompt, and query parameters which are passed to external AI models.
  • Boundary markers: The documentation lacks instructions for the agent to use delimiters or sanitization techniques to distinguish between system instructions and data originating from these untrusted inputs.
  • Capability inventory: The skill relies on the vg generate CLI for network communication with remote AI providers and supports file system writes via the --download flag in multiple processing chains (e.g., in references/image-to-3d.md).
  • Sanitization: No evidence of input validation or sanitization is present in the provided instructions.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of a global Node.js package from a non-standard source.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md instructs the agent to run npm install -g vibedgames to enable its functionality.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions frequently use shell command execution to perform core tasks, including model discovery, schema inspection, and executing media generation workflows.
  • Evidence: Examples like vg generate run, vg generate models, and vg generate upload are used extensively throughout the skill and its references.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 28, 2026, 12:18 PM