model-catalog
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to ingest and process untrusted data from users and external sources, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: The skill takes user-provided task descriptions as input for the
vg generate modelscommand. Furthermore, the modality reference files (e.g.,audio-to-text.md,image-to-image.md) document the use ofaudio_url,image_url,prompt, andqueryparameters which are passed to external AI models. - Boundary markers: The documentation lacks instructions for the agent to use delimiters or sanitization techniques to distinguish between system instructions and data originating from these untrusted inputs.
- Capability inventory: The skill relies on the
vg generateCLI for network communication with remote AI providers and supports file system writes via the--downloadflag in multiple processing chains (e.g., inreferences/image-to-3d.md). - Sanitization: No evidence of input validation or sanitization is present in the provided instructions.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of a global Node.js package from a non-standard source.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to runnpm install -g vibedgamesto enable its functionality. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions frequently use shell command execution to perform core tasks, including model discovery, schema inspection, and executing media generation workflows.
- Evidence: Examples like
vg generate run,vg generate models, andvg generate uploadare used extensively throughout the skill and its references.
Audit Metadata