fal-image
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of a third-party CLI tool
vibedgamesvia npm and fetches content fromfal.aiendpoints (queue.fal.runandapi.fal.ai) during operation.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The AI agent is instructed to execute shell commands using thevgCLI tool, such asvg image generateandvg image edit, which include parameters derived from user input.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection. - Ingestion points: User-provided text prompts and local image reference files processed via command-line arguments.
- Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are used to separate untrusted prompt content from command parameters.
- Capability inventory: The skill executes shell commands with network access to external APIs and file system read/write access for image processing.
- Sanitization: No visible sanitization or validation of user-provided prompt strings is performed before they are interpolated into shell commands.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses local image files to convert them into data URIs (e.g., in
scripts/_fal_common.py) for transmission to external image generation models. This behavior is necessary for the skill's primary function of image editing.\n- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The maintainer-only scripts utilize environment variables (FAL_KEYorFAL_API_KEY) for API authentication, following standard security practices for local development tools.
Audit Metadata