generate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies extensively on executing shell commands through the
vgCLI to perform all operations, including running models, searching the catalog, and managing files. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of external software packages, specifically
vibedgamesand@openai/codexvia NPM, to function. These are documented as necessary dependencies for the CLI interface. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
vg generate uploadcommand enables the transmission of local files to a remote CDN. While this is a core feature for providing reference images to generative models, it represents a potential vector for exfiltrating sensitive local data if the agent is misdirected. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill features a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests and processes untrusted data from external sources.
- Ingestion points: External data enters the context through
vg generate models(catalog search),vg generate docs(documentation search), and the results returned fromvg generate run(model outputs). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety markers to differentiate between system instructions and data retrieved from the CLI tool.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute shell commands via the
vgCLI, write files to the local system using the--downloadflag, and upload files to external servers using theuploadcommand. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the external content before it is processed by the agent.
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