igrantio-frontend-client
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface through the ingestion and interpolation of untrusted exchange identifiers into API request paths.\n
- Ingestion points: Identifier strings such as
exchangeIdandcredentialExchangeIdare accepted by methods inowsClient.tsandsseClient.ts.\n - Boundary markers: The code lacks sanitization or explicit delimiters to prevent path-traversal sequences (e.g.,
../) in these identifiers.\n - Capability inventory: The library utilizes
fetch(including DELETE operations) and theEventSourceAPI acrossowsClient.tsandsseClient.ts.\n - Sanitization: Identifiers are directly interpolated into template literals (e.g.,
${base}/${id}for deletion insseClient.ts), potentially allowing access to unintended API paths if the identifier is maliciously crafted.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: TheopenInWallethelper inQrCode.tsxassigns a provided URI directly towindow.location.href. The absence of URI scheme validation could allow for the execution ofjavascript:URIs if the URI is sourced from untrusted data.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill specifiesqrcodeandreactas dependencies inpackage.json, which are standard and necessary for its functionality as a React-based frontend client.
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