agent-reach

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 1, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation instructions direct the agent to download and execute code from a third-party GitHub archive (https://github.com/Panniantong/agent-reach/archive/main.zip) using pipx or pip. This execution of unverified remote code during the setup process is a primary security concern.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches the core application and various channel dependencies from external GitHub repositories. While the repositories are public, the source is an individual account rather than a pre-verified or well-known technology organization.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill extensively uses shell commands for environment modification, installation, system diagnostics (agent-reach doctor), and retrieving content from the web via the CLI tool.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes an attack surface for indirect prompt injection through its web-scraping capabilities.
  • Ingestion points: The agent ingests data retrieved by the agent-reach CLI from untrusted external sources, including Twitter/X, Reddit, and various web pages.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety warnings to help the agent distinguish between its instructions and the fetched data.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands, manage files in ~/.agent-reach/, and perform network operations.
  • Sanitization: Absent. There is no mechanism described for sanitizing or escaping the content retrieved from the web before the agent processes it.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 1, 2026, 01:13 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — agent-reach