agent-reach
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation instructions direct the agent to download and execute code from a third-party GitHub archive (
https://github.com/Panniantong/agent-reach/archive/main.zip) usingpipxorpip. This execution of unverified remote code during the setup process is a primary security concern. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches the core application and various channel dependencies from external GitHub repositories. While the repositories are public, the source is an individual account rather than a pre-verified or well-known technology organization.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill extensively uses shell commands for environment modification, installation, system diagnostics (
agent-reach doctor), and retrieving content from the web via the CLI tool. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes an attack surface for indirect prompt injection through its web-scraping capabilities.
- Ingestion points: The agent ingests data retrieved by the
agent-reachCLI from untrusted external sources, including Twitter/X, Reddit, and various web pages. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety warnings to help the agent distinguish between its instructions and the fetched data.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands, manage files in
~/.agent-reach/, and perform network operations. - Sanitization: Absent. There is no mechanism described for sanitizing or escaping the content retrieved from the web before the agent processes it.
Audit Metadata