mckinsey-7s
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources and user-provided inputs, creating an attack surface where malicious content could influence the final report.
- Ingestion points: The orchestration logic in
SKILL.md(Stage 1) instructs subagents to use 'available retrieval' for public organization data and ingests user-providedORGANIZATIONandCONTEXTvariables. - Boundary markers: The instructions include behavioral directives to 'describe what is actually true,' but do not employ structural delimiters (e.g., XML tags or clear boundaries) to separate untrusted retrieved data from the agent's internal logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill is capable of writing a markdown report to the local file system using the
savetool or equivalent file-writing capabilities. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of content retrieved from the web before it is processed by the analyst subagents.- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses user input to determine the name of the file it saves, which could lead to unauthorized file placement.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdspecifies saving the report tomckinsey-7s-<organization-slug>-<YYYY-MM-DD>.mdin the working directory. If the<organization-slug>derived from the user-providedORGANIZATIONvariable is not sanitized for path traversal characters (e.g.,../), the agent might attempt to write files to unintended locations.
Audit Metadata