rota-capture
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of shell commands through the
rotaCLI tool to create (rota item create), audit (rota item shipped), and remove (rota item rm) backlog items. These commands are executed directly in the shell environment using data provided by the user. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted user input (e.g., brain-dumps of bugs, tasks, or features) and interpolates this content directly into shell command arguments (e.g.,
--title,--desc). If the agent does not properly escape shell metacharacters or quotes within the user-supplied text, it could lead to command injection. - Ingestion points: User-provided text describing work items in
SKILL.md(Step 2) and milestone specs inmilestone-spec-audit.md(Step 2.5). - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not provide guidance on how to delimit or escape user input when generating shell commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes shell capabilities for item management, including creation, deletion, and modifying issue labels through the
rotaCLI and piped commands likejq. - Sanitization: The skill lacks explicit instructions or logic to escape, validate, or filter user-supplied content before it is interpolated into commands.
Audit Metadata