orchestrate-tmux
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 23, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive process environment information by reading
/proc/$pid/environand usingps eww. This is used to identifyCLAUDE_CONFIG_DIRbut potentially exposes other secrets such as API keys and tokens present in the environment. - [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: The skill scans shell configuration files (
~/.zshrc,~/.bashrc) and agent-specific configuration directories (~/.claude*) to discover environment settings and account wrappers. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements an indirect prompt injection surface by fetching and processing untrusted data from external issue trackers (GitHub/GitLab API) and monitoring output from other agent panes.
- Ingestion points: Reads issue bodies and comments via
gh apiandglab api. Monitorstmuxpanes usingtmux capture-pane. - Boundary markers: Utilizes signed messages (e.g.,
--- ORCHESTRATOR (round N) ---) and manual human-in-the-loop checkpoints to distinguish authorized instructions. - Capability inventory: Executes shell commands via
tmux send-keys, manages git worktrees, and performs repository merges. - Sanitization: Recommends file-based API body editing to prevent shell interpretation of markdown content, but lacks formal sanitization of ingested issue text.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill drives external agent sessions by dynamically injecting commands into
tmuxpanes usingtmux send-keys. This includes passing instructions and data between the orchestrator and worker instances.
Audit Metadata