codex-collaboration
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 19, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/codex_session.pyscript serves as a wrapper for several system-level commands, usingsubprocess.run()to executecodexCLI operations,gitstatus/log checks, andlsoffor process tracking. This execution mechanism allows the agent to interact with the underlying operating system and external tools based on session data. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to ingest and process 'rollout' transcripts from previous Codex sessions. These transcripts represent external, untrusted data that could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the behavior of the agent currently reading them.
- Ingestion points: The
iter_eventsfunction inscripts/codex_session.pyreads JSONL rollout files from~/.codex/sessions/. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit boundary markers or instructions to treat transcript content as untrusted data during the
tailorextractoperations. - Capability inventory: The script possesses capabilities for file system writes (
extract,handoffcommands) and arbitrary shell execution throughcodexdelegation andgitcommands. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the transcript text before it is presented to the agent or written to output files.
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The
delegatesubcommand inscripts/codex_session.pyincludes a--full-autoflag. When used, this flag passes the--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandboxargument to the Codex CLI, explicitly disabling safety constraints and sandboxing protections for the execution environment. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
ownersfunction inscripts/codex_session.pyperforms a sensitive scan of the/procfilesystem. It iterates through all active process IDs and their file descriptors (/proc/[pid]/fd) to identify which processes have the rollout files open. This constitutes information gathering of system-wide process activity which is often restricted or considered sensitive metadata. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The script references a specific, hardcoded path for a quota probe:
/home/lachlan/ProjectsLFS/AgenticApp/agentic_tools/wechat_gui_agent/scripts/codex_quota_status.py. While this appears to be a local path for the author, the mechanism allows for the execution of an external script file that is not distributed with the skill itself, creating a dependency on unverifiable local environment configurations.
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