ai-repo-to-pi-package
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process a 'source repo', including its internal prompts and instructions. This untrusted external data could contain malicious instructions meant to override the agent's behavior during the conversion process.
- Ingestion points: Source repository files, prompts, and instructions mentioned in
SKILL.md('understand the ai repository'). - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions to delimit or ignore instructions found within the source repository.
- Capability inventory: File system writing (creating
.pi/structure), CLI execution (pi print,pi terminal), and subagent orchestration. - Sanitization: Absent. The instructions state 'repo source code and prompts are only truth', indicating the agent will faithfully process all content found in the source.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the execution of CLI tools for auditing and verification.
- Evidence: Instructions include
pi print --approveand the use of thepi terminal toolfor verification. - Context: The
--approveflag suggests automated approval of loaded resources, which reduces manual oversight. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill identifies specific external dependencies required for the conversion process.
- Evidence: Lists
npm:pi-subagentsandnpm:pi-hermes-memoryas required packages.
Audit Metadata