azure-playwright-migration-skill
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 7, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICALEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads the HyperExecute CLI executable directly from the vendor's official domain.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdandreference/hyperexecute.mdprovide instructions to fetch the binary fromhttps://downloads.lambdatest.com/hyperexecute/linux/hyperexecute. - Note: This is a legitimate vendor resource used for the migration's target platform.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute multiple shell commands for repository scanning and build verification.
- Evidence: Runs
python3 scripts/detect.py <repo>to identify vendor fingerprints. - Evidence: Executes build tool commands such as
mvn -q test-compile,npx playwright test --list, anddotnet buildto verify the success of the migration. - Evidence: Grants execution permissions (
chmod u+x) and runs the downloaded HyperExecute CLI. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from the user's local repository, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/detect.pyreads and analyzes files throughout the provided repository path. - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the detection or modification logic.
- Capability inventory: The agent has capabilities to write to the file system, execute shell commands (including compilers and the migration CLI), and perform network operations.
- Sanitization: Content from the scanned repository is not sanitized before being processed by the agent's logic, which could allow malicious instructions embedded in the source code to influence the migration workflow.
Recommendations
- Contains 1 malicious URL(s) - DO NOT USE
Audit Metadata