browser-cloud
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is primarily designed to fetch, scrape, and process content from external, untrusted websites, which is the primary vector for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: URLs and task descriptions are passed to tools in
examples/scrape-agent.ts,examples/langchain-browser-tool.ts, andreferences/integrations/crewai.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters provided to the agent to treat the results from browser sessions as untrusted or potentially malicious data.
- Capability inventory: The agent is granted extensive capabilities including full browser control (navigation, clicking, typing), network access, and file system interaction.
- Sanitization: The skill performs basic truncation of content (e.g.,
slice(0, 10000)) but does not implement structural sanitization, filtering, or escaping of the scraped web content. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill includes a 'File Upload and Download' pattern (
references/patterns/files.md) that provides code to read files from the local filesystem (fs.readFileSync) and upload them to a remote cloud browser session. While intended for form submissions, this creates a capability that could be misused to exfiltrate sensitive local files (e.g., SSH keys or environment files) if an agent is manipulated via prompt injection. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions and integration references include shell command execution for setting up the environment and bridging language runtimes.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to runnpm installoryarn addfor the@testmuai/browser-cloudpackage if it is missing.references/integrations/crewai.mdprovides a pattern usingsubprocess.runto execute a Node.js bridge script vianpx ts-node.
Audit Metadata