faceless-explainer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- Subprocess Execution: The skill executes external binaries such as
ffmpeg,ffprobe, andnodeto perform video and audio processing tasks. These are invoked usingspawnSyncwith arguments passed as an array, which is a standard practice to mitigate command injection risks. - Evidence: Subprocess calls are found in
scripts/assemble-index.mjs(forffmpegandffprobe) andscripts/audio.mjs(for executing the audio engine). - Remote Resource Acquisition: The skill utilizes
npx hyperframesto initialize projects, update skill definitions from GitHub, and fetch components from a remote registry. These operations involve downloading and potentially executing code from external sources to maintain the video generation environment. - Evidence:
SKILL.mdcontains instructions fornpx hyperframes skills update,npx hyperframes init, andnpx hyperframes addto acquire remote resources. - Indirect Prompt Injection Surface: As a text-to-video generation tool, this skill ingests untrusted data from articles or notes to create video scripts and storyboards. This creates a potential surface where malicious instructions embedded in the source data could influence the agent's output.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.mdStep 1 processes user-provided text fromBRIEF.mdandvisible-text.txt. - Boundary markers: The skill instructions emphasize using the input text as a source of information, but explicit adversarial boundary markers are not strictly enforced.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands via
npx, perform file system operations, and run sub-agents. - Sanitization: Final assembly scripts include some basic escaping (e.g., in
scripts/captions.mjs), but the initial narrative design phase is susceptible to instructional influence. - Autonomous Execution Mode: The skill features an "autonomous mode" that bypasses manual approval checkpoints for storyboards and visual designs. This reduces human oversight, which could allow unintended content to be processed through the video generation pipeline.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdStep 3 and Step 6 describe an autonomous mode that proceeds without user confirmation. - Verbatim Information Relay: The agent is instructed to relay the output of authentication status commands verbatim. Depending on the tool's behavior, this could inadvertently expose configuration details or login states in the session history.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdStep 0 instructs the agent to runnpx hyperframes auth statusand relay its output verbatim.
Audit Metadata