deep-agents-memory
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- Filesystem Interaction and Persistence: The skill enables persistent storage across agent sessions and allows the agent to interact with the local filesystem through tools like
read_fileandwrite_file. While this is the intended functionality for agent memory, it involves direct disk access. The documentation mitigates potential risks by recommending the use ofvirtual_mode=Trueto prevent directory traversal andinterrupt_onsettings to require human approval for file modifications. - Indirect Prompt Injection Surface: The inclusion of tools for reading filesystem content (
read_file,grep,glob) creates a surface where the agent could ingest data containing hidden or adversarial instructions. This represents a potential indirect prompt injection vector if the files being processed originate from untrusted external sources. - Ingestion points: File reading and searching tools such as
read_file,grep, andglob(documented inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The documentation does not specify the use of delimiters or specific instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands within processed files.
- Capability inventory: The agent possesses writing capabilities (
write_file,edit_file) which could be misused if an injection attack is successful. - Sanitization: The skill emphasizes path-level security via
virtual_modebut does not detail sanitization or validation of the content read from files.
Audit Metadata