langchain-rag
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- Unsafe Deserialization Consideration: The skill demonstrates using
allow_dangerous_deserialization=Truewhen loading local FAISS indices inSKILL.md. This pattern uses Python'spicklemodule under the hood, which can execute arbitrary code if the index file being loaded has been tampered with or originates from an untrusted source. - Indirect Prompt Injection Surface: The skill ingests data from external sources (PDFs, local directories, and websites) and interpolates this content directly into the LLM prompt.
- Ingestion points:
PyPDFLoader,WebBaseLoader,DirectoryLoader, and thesearch_docstool inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill uses basic string interpolation (
Use this context:\n\n{context}) without robust delimiters or explicit instructions to ignore embedded commands. - Capability inventory: The agent is provided with a
search_docstool that can fetch potentially attacker-controlled content. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering applied to the retrieved content before it is processed by the agent.
- External Data Fetching: The skill utilizes
WebBaseLoaderto retrieve content from external URLs (specificallydocs.langchain.com). While fetching from documentation is a standard RAG use case, users should be aware of the network operations performed during document loading.
Audit Metadata