lark-apps
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection through data ingestion and processing.
- Ingestion points: The creative design workflow in
creative-design.mdparses external CSV, JSON, XLSX, Zip files, and document formats like Word and PDF. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or instructions to ignore natural language commands within the data are required when interpolating content into the agent context.
- Capability inventory: The agent has capabilities to execute shell commands via
lark-cliandgit, perform file system operations, and manage network requests through the CLI. - Sanitization: The prompts do not define specific sanitization or filtering logic for data extracted from these external sources.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches several external JavaScript libraries for its design components.
- Sources: Downloads React, ReactDOM, Babel, and ECharts from
sf3-scmcdn-cn.feishucdn.com. - Context: These are well-known libraries hosted on the vendor's official content delivery network and are used within the HTML applications generated by the skill.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes various commands using a specialized platform tool.
- Evidence: Uses
lark-cli appscommand family for database operations, application releases, and configuration management. - Context: These commands are the intended mechanism for interacting with the platform's API and managing the developer's cloud resources.
Audit Metadata