lark-slides
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external XML data from Lark/Feishu presentations via the
slides +xml-getshortcut. This represents a potential surface for indirect injection if a presentation contains malicious payloads. - Ingestion Points: Remote presentation content is retrieved via
slides +xml-getand loaded into the agent context or local files. - Boundary Markers: The skill does not explicitly use markers to separate untrusted XML content within the prompt, but it enforces strict schema validation.
- Capability Inventory: The agent can modify or delete documents using
lark-clibased on the parsed data. - Sanitization: Employs a robust validation suite (
scripts/xml_lint.pyandscripts/sxsd_validator.py) to verify XML structure, schema compliance, and layout sanity before any creation or update operations. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes Python scripts and test suites that execute local skill-provided files using the system's Python interpreter.
- Evidence:
scripts/iconpark_tool_test.pyandscripts/xml_lint_test.pyusesubprocess.runto execute internal CLI utilities during testing. - Evidence:
scripts/xml_text_overlap_lint.pyacts as a proxy for the main linting logic. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: A compatibility script uses process replacement to delegate execution to a newer script version.
- Evidence:
scripts/xml_text_overlap_lint_test.pyusesos.execvto executexml_lint_test.py. This is a controlled use of process replacement targeting a known local file path.
Audit Metadata