naming-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external source code files which are untrusted ingestion points, creating a vulnerability where malicious code content or comments could attempt to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Project source files identifying data models and functions (SKILL.md, Step 1).
- Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety prompts to prevent the agent from being influenced by instructions embedded within the analyzed code.
- Capability inventory: The agent can run local commands (ripgrep), execute a shell script (naming-smells.sh), run external linters, write HTML report files, and perform file-system modifications via renaming tools (SKILL.md, Steps 0, 5, and 6).
- Sanitization: There is no documented sanitization or filtering of the source code content before it is processed by the agent or integrated into output reports.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local commands for static analysis and project auditing.
- Evidence: The skill runs
ripgrepfor pattern matching and utilizes a local bash scriptscripts/naming-smells.shfor heuristic-based smell detection. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill integrates with external development tools and linters.
- Evidence: Instructions include running
revive,golangci-lint,eslint,clippy, andruff. These are well-known and trusted tools within their respective language ecosystems.
Audit Metadata