just-fucking-do-it
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses directive and imperative language designed to override the agent's default safety or cautious behavior. Instructions such as "Don't turn that checklist into a request for permission," "No ‘should I proceed?’ for reading files [or] editing within scope," and "Stop dithering and do the damn work" are explicitly intended to suppress confirmation steps and move the agent into a more autonomous, less restricted mode of operation.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: By instructing the agent to skip confirmation requests for actions like "reading files" and "editing within scope," the skill creates a high-risk surface for indirect prompt injection. If an agent processes a file or external data containing malicious instructions, the 'Just Do It' directive may lead the agent to execute those instructions immediately without presenting them to the user for approval.
- Ingestion points: The skill instructions in
SKILL.md(Step 2: "Inspect the relevant evidence") explicitly encourage the agent to ingest external evidence and act on it immediately. - Boundary markers: There are no instructions regarding delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded within the processed data.
- Capability inventory: The skill encourages "reading files, editing within scope, [and] running local checks," which involves file system access and potentially local command execution.
- Sanitization: There are no instructions provided for sanitizing or validating external input before acting upon it.
Audit Metadata