english-conversation

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 19, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the macOS say command via a bash shell to provide text-to-speech feedback. The agent's generated response is interpolated directly into the command string. While the instructions include a sanitization step to escape single quotes, this pattern remains vulnerable to command injection if the model fails to sanitize the output perfectly or if other shell-active characters are present.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill records session summaries, including specific user errors and corrections, to a persistent storage system (mcp__serena). This externalizes user conversational data and learning progress to a memory service.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The memory persistence feature introduces a surface for indirect prompt injection. Because the agent reads past session data via mcp__serena__list_memories, a user could potentially provide malicious instructions during one session that are stored and then influence the agent's behavior in a subsequent session.
  • Ingestion points: User messages are processed and stored in eikaiwa_session_ and eikaiwa_vocab_ memory files.
  • Boundary markers: None explicitly defined for the memory content retrieved from the storage service.
  • Capability inventory: bash (via say), mcp__serena__write_memory, mcp__serena__list_memories (found in SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: The skill provides logic to escape single quotes before passing text to the bash command, but no sanitization is mentioned for data retrieved from memory.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
May 19, 2026, 01:46 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — english-conversation