english-conversation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the macOS
saycommand via abashshell to provide text-to-speech feedback. The agent's generated response is interpolated directly into the command string. While the instructions include a sanitization step to escape single quotes, this pattern remains vulnerable to command injection if the model fails to sanitize the output perfectly or if other shell-active characters are present. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill records session summaries, including specific user errors and corrections, to a persistent storage system (
mcp__serena). This externalizes user conversational data and learning progress to a memory service. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The memory persistence feature introduces a surface for indirect prompt injection. Because the agent reads past session data via
mcp__serena__list_memories, a user could potentially provide malicious instructions during one session that are stored and then influence the agent's behavior in a subsequent session. - Ingestion points: User messages are processed and stored in
eikaiwa_session_andeikaiwa_vocab_memory files. - Boundary markers: None explicitly defined for the memory content retrieved from the storage service.
- Capability inventory:
bash(viasay),mcp__serena__write_memory,mcp__serena__list_memories(found inSKILL.md). - Sanitization: The skill provides logic to escape single quotes before passing text to the
bashcommand, but no sanitization is mentioned for data retrieved from memory.
Audit Metadata