a2a-protocols
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documents how to build a message-receiving endpoint (
/agents/{agent_id}/messages) that passes external content directly to an agent's processing function. This configuration creates a vulnerability surface where a malicious agent could influence another agent's behavior via embedded instructions. - Ingestion points:
receive_messageendpoint inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The code does not demonstrate the use of delimiters or "ignore" instructions for the incoming message content.
- Capability inventory: The skill examples include capabilities for database searching, notification sending, and task handoffs.
- Sanitization: No input validation or sanitization of the
message.contentdictionary is shown before it is processed. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The implementation of the Model Context Protocol (MCP) client uses
StdioServerParametersto launchmcp_server.pyas a subprocess. This is a standard architectural requirement for the Model Context Protocol (supported by Anthropic) but involves local command execution. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
AgentCommunicatorperforms network POST requests to external URLs retrieved from a registry. This establishes a communication channel to non-whitelisted domains which could be used to transmit agent context or data between different systems during the A2A coordination process.
Audit Metadata