a2a-protocols

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documents how to build a message-receiving endpoint (/agents/{agent_id}/messages) that passes external content directly to an agent's processing function. This configuration creates a vulnerability surface where a malicious agent could influence another agent's behavior via embedded instructions.
  • Ingestion points: receive_message endpoint in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The code does not demonstrate the use of delimiters or "ignore" instructions for the incoming message content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill examples include capabilities for database searching, notification sending, and task handoffs.
  • Sanitization: No input validation or sanitization of the message.content dictionary is shown before it is processed.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The implementation of the Model Context Protocol (MCP) client uses StdioServerParameters to launch mcp_server.py as a subprocess. This is a standard architectural requirement for the Model Context Protocol (supported by Anthropic) but involves local command execution.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The AgentCommunicator performs network POST requests to external URLs retrieved from a registry. This establishes a communication channel to non-whitelisted domains which could be used to transmit agent context or data between different systems during the A2A coordination process.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 31, 2026, 01:20 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — a2a-protocols