llm-evals-checklist
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes untrusted external data from the project codebase, including log files (.log), data exports (.csv, .jsonl), and documentation (CLAUDE.md).
- Ingestion points: Project files including
.json,.csv,.jsonl,.log, and.envare searched and parsed to identify tracing setups and log volume. - Boundary markers: None identified. The skill does not implement specific delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when reading content from these files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to read local files and search the directory structure. It does not possess network-write or external command execution capabilities.
- Sanitization: None identified. The content of the logs and project files is used directly to determine readiness status.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill instructs the agent to search for sensitive files and environment variables, specifically targeting
.envfiles and theLATITUDE_API_KEY. - Evidence: The instructions explicitly ask the agent to 'Search the codebase' for 'Environment variables referencing observability: LATITUDE_API_KEY... or any logging... to a file, database, or external service.'
- Context: As the skill is authored by the vendor associated with these keys (latitude-dev), this behavior is consistent with a readiness check for their own platform. There is no evidence of network instructions to exfiltrate these keys to an unauthorized third party.
- [SAFE]: The skill references external documentation and tools from well-known and trusted services.
- Evidence: Links to
docs.latitude.soand references to tools likeopentelemetry,langsmith, andbraintrustare used appropriately for their intended purpose in observability workflows.
Audit Metadata