investigate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to use shell tools to process large data outputs that have been persisted to files.
- Evidence: In
SKILL.md, the 'Universal guidance' section states: 'When a tool result is persisted to a file... use Bash with python3 or jq to extract the specific slice you need.' This encourages the use of a shell execution environment to handle large tool responses. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and analyze external observability data, which serves as an attack surface for instructions embedded in logs, traces, or error messages.
- Ingestion points: The skill uses
query-logs,query-traces,query-error-groups, andquery-sessionsinSKILL.mdto fetch external data. - Boundary markers: There are no instructions in
SKILL.mdor companion files (logs.md,errors.md, etc.) to use delimiters or ignore instructions embedded within the processed observability data. - Capability inventory: The agent has access to
Bash,python3, andjqfor file processing as described inSKILL.md, and performs multiple data-retrieval tool calls. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the fetched observability data is mentioned in the instructions.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on an external connection to a remotely hosted MCP server.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdspecifies a requirement for the 'remotely hosted LaunchDarkly MCP server' in the frontmatter and prerequisites. This represents a dependency on the vendor's infrastructure.
Audit Metadata