health-plugins
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONSAFE
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: JQ filter construction in the registry repair script.
- Evidence: In
scripts/fix-registry.sh(lines 126-130), the script constructs ajqfilter by interpolatingplugin_keyvalues directly into a string:jq_filter="${jq_filter} | del(.plugins[\"${plugin_key}\"])". - Description: If the plugin registry contains a key with characters like
"], it can manipulate thejqfilter to perform unintended modifications to the registry JSON or the settings file, potentially leading to data corruption or clearing configuration values. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect injection surface from processing local registry files.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads
~/.claude/plugins/installed_plugins.jsonin bothcheck-registry.shandfix-registry.sh. - Boundary markers: Absent; the content is parsed as JSON and keys are used directly in the script's control flow.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
Bashtool to perform file operations (cp, mv, rm) and modify local configuration files based on the parsed data. - Sanitization: Absent; keys extracted from the registry are not validated or escaped before being interpolated into command strings.
- [SAFE]: Dynamic context injection for environment discovery.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mduses the!commandsyntax to runpwdandfindcommands at load time. - Context: The commands are hardcoded, perform read-only operations on the project directory, and do not involve user-controlled input, making them a safe use of the feature for environment introspection.
- [SAFE]: File access is restricted to the user's Claude Code configuration and the current project directory, which is consistent with the skill's stated maintenance purpose.
Audit Metadata