health-plugins

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 22, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONSAFE
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: JQ filter construction in the registry repair script.
  • Evidence: In scripts/fix-registry.sh (lines 126-130), the script constructs a jq filter by interpolating plugin_key values directly into a string: jq_filter="${jq_filter} | del(.plugins[\"${plugin_key}\"])".
  • Description: If the plugin registry contains a key with characters like "], it can manipulate the jq filter to perform unintended modifications to the registry JSON or the settings file, potentially leading to data corruption or clearing configuration values.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect injection surface from processing local registry files.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads ~/.claude/plugins/installed_plugins.json in both check-registry.sh and fix-registry.sh.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the content is parsed as JSON and keys are used directly in the script's control flow.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses the Bash tool to perform file operations (cp, mv, rm) and modify local configuration files based on the parsed data.
  • Sanitization: Absent; keys extracted from the registry are not validated or escaped before being interpolated into command strings.
  • [SAFE]: Dynamic context injection for environment discovery.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md uses the !command syntax to run pwd and find commands at load time.
  • Context: The commands are hardcoded, perform read-only operations on the project directory, and do not involve user-controlled input, making them a safe use of the feature for environment introspection.
  • [SAFE]: File access is restricted to the user's Claude Code configuration and the current project directory, which is consistent with the skill's stated maintenance purpose.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 22, 2026, 05:06 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — health-plugins