imagemagick-conversion
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to process external image files and use commands like
magick identify -verboseto read image metadata and properties. Malicious files could contain instructions designed to influence agent behavior when the metadata is read. - Ingestion points: Local image files provided or requested by the user for processing (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: Absent; there are no specific instructions to the agent to disregard or sanitize instructions that might be embedded in image metadata fields like EXIF, IPTC, or XMP.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
Bash,Read,Grep, andGlobtools to execute commands and inspect file contents. - Sanitization: Absent; the documentation does not include steps to filter or escape content retrieved from image metadata.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill heavily relies on the
Bashtool to executemagickandmogrifycommands for image manipulation. - Evidence: Multiple code examples in
SKILL.mddemonstrate shell command patterns using wildcards (e.g.,*.jpg) and shell variables (e.g.,"$img"). While the examples use quotes to mitigate simple word splitting, the reliance on shell execution creates a surface for command injection if the agent constructs commands using unsanitized user-provided filenames containing shell metacharacters.
Audit Metadata