client-instruction-schedule
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow involves several command-line utilities for document processing. In SKILL.md, steps 1 and 8 specify using
pdftoppm,tesseract,md5sum,soffice,unzip, andsedfor OCR, file hashing, document conversion, and XML modification. These represent standard subprocess invocations within a document management context. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its core function of processing external, untrusted litigation data.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads an entire case folder containing diverse documents such as witness statements, correspondence, and counsel's advice (SKILL.md, Workflow Step 1).
- Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or boundary markers are defined to isolate untrusted content from the agent's instructions during summarization.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file-write capabilities (
fs.writeFileSyncinbuild-schedule-example.js) and access to multiple shell-based processing tools (sed,unzip, etc.). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or content sanitization applied to the extracted legal text before it is interpolated into the final Word document template.
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