cookie-policy-malik-taiar
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to fetch and analyze content from external, user-provided website URLs to identify cookies and tracking technologies, which constitutes an ingestion point for untrusted data.
- Ingestion points: Step 2 of the workflow in
SKILL.md(andSKILL.fr.md) directs the agent to visit a target URL provided by the user to perform research. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or specific safety warnings when processing this external content.
- Capability inventory: The agent utilizes
WebFetchto read external sites and subsequently performs text generation to draft a policy. - Sanitization: No specific sanitization or escaping of the fetched content is mentioned before it is processed by the agent.
- Mitigation: The risk is partially mitigated by the mandatory requirement in Step 1 and Step 3 to use a pre-defined, validated template (
assets/sample_template_politique_cookies.docx), which restricts the agent from drafting the policy from scratch or deviating from established wording. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill retrieves current regulatory guidelines and FAQs from official government resources using the
WebFetchtool. - Evidence: Fetches data from multiple official URLs on
cnil.fr, such ashttps://www.cnil.fr/fr/cookies-et-autres-traceurs/regles/cookies. - Context: These references target a well-known official organization (the French Data Protection Authority) and are essential for providing accurate and up-to-date legal guidance.
Audit Metadata