skill-optimizer-lawvable
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it is designed to ingest and process conversation history—which can contain attacker-controlled input—and convert those "signals" into persistent instructions in other
SKILL.mdfiles. - Ingestion points: The skill scans the entire current conversation for feedback signals (corrections, successes, edge cases).
- Boundary markers: The skill uses four quality criteria (Complete, Precise, Atomic, Stable) to filter signals and requires explicit user approval ("Apply these changes? [Y/n]") before updating files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to read and write to the filesystem, specifically targeting
SKILL.md,CHANGELOG.md, andOBSERVATIONS.mdfiles within theskills/directory. - Sanitization: The skill asks for user clarification when signals are ambiguous, but it does not employ specific escaping or sanitization of the injected text beyond the quality checks.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses basic shell commands for state management.
- Evidence: It executes
rm -f ./.disabledto enable automatic mode andtouch ./.disabledto disable it. - Hook Mechanism: The skill includes a bash script
scripts/self-improve-hook.shintended to be added to the platform's "stop" hook. This script executes at the end of sessions to trigger the self-improvement logic. While this introduces an auto-execution surface, the script itself is local and its current function is limited to outputting a system message for the agent.
Audit Metadata