marionette-flutter-drive-app

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from the target Flutter application's UI and logs, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection if the application displays content controlled by an external attacker.\n
  • Ingestion points: Data is ingested via get_interactive_elements, take_screenshots, and get_logs (documented in SKILL.md).\n
  • Boundary markers: Absent. There are no specific instructions or delimiters provided to the agent to distinguish between legitimate UI content and potential malicious instructions.\n
  • Capability inventory: The agent can perform UI interactions (tap, enter_text), trigger developer workflows (hot_reload, hot_restart), and execute shell commands via the marionette CLI bridge.\n
  • Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of filtering or sanitization of the retrieved UI text or log data.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the execution of shell commands for installation and operation.\n
  • Evidence: Instructions include flutter pub add marionette_flutter, dart pub global activate marionette_mcp, and usage of the marionette CLI (e.g., marionette tap --key ...).\n
  • Context: These commands target vendor-owned resources (marionette_flutter, marionette_mcp, marionette_cli) from the author leancodepl and represent standard integration procedures.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 8, 2026, 03:32 AM