carl-file-organizer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests user-controlled filesystem metadata, such as file and directory names, and passes them to the AI agent to generate human-readable explanations in a report. This presents a surface where a maliciously named file could attempt to influence the agent's reasoning.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/storage_scan.pyandscripts/carl_file_organizer/scanner.pyscan names and paths from the local disk. - Boundary markers: Absent; filenames are processed directly for descriptive reasoning.
- Capability inventory:
scripts/carl_file_organizer/executor.pyandscripts/carl_file_organizer/dispose.pycan perform destructive actions like moving, trashing, or deleting files. - Sanitization: The tool mitigates this risk by separating AI commentary from actual security decisions. File classification (e.g., determining if a file is in a 'Red' no-go zone) is handled by static Python rules, and the agent's notes cannot override the action permissions or execution state. UI outputs are HTML-escaped to prevent script injection.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes various system utilities to gather diagnostics and perform maintenance tasks.
- System utilities: gathering data via
df,sw_vers,sysctl,uname,uptime,memory_pressure, andvm_stat. - Safety verification: gathered using
lsofto check for active file locks before operations. - Maintenance: using
osascript(for trashing on macOS),xattr(for Finder tags), and standardshutillibrary functions. - Safety implementation: All commands are invoked as hardcoded argument lists via
subprocess.runorPopenwithout using a shell environment, preventing command injection.
Audit Metadata