carl-file-organizer

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests user-controlled filesystem metadata, such as file and directory names, and passes them to the AI agent to generate human-readable explanations in a report. This presents a surface where a maliciously named file could attempt to influence the agent's reasoning.
  • Ingestion points: scripts/storage_scan.py and scripts/carl_file_organizer/scanner.py scan names and paths from the local disk.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; filenames are processed directly for descriptive reasoning.
  • Capability inventory: scripts/carl_file_organizer/executor.py and scripts/carl_file_organizer/dispose.py can perform destructive actions like moving, trashing, or deleting files.
  • Sanitization: The tool mitigates this risk by separating AI commentary from actual security decisions. File classification (e.g., determining if a file is in a 'Red' no-go zone) is handled by static Python rules, and the agent's notes cannot override the action permissions or execution state. UI outputs are HTML-escaped to prevent script injection.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes various system utilities to gather diagnostics and perform maintenance tasks.
  • System utilities: gathering data via df, sw_vers, sysctl, uname, uptime, memory_pressure, and vm_stat.
  • Safety verification: gathered using lsof to check for active file locks before operations.
  • Maintenance: using osascript (for trashing on macOS), xattr (for Finder tags), and standard shutil library functions.
  • Safety implementation: All commands are invoked as hardcoded argument lists via subprocess.run or Popen without using a shell environment, preventing command injection.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 2, 2026, 06:54 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — carl-file-organizer