cinematic-film-still-by-1l42ctj
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process data from external, untrusted sources which could contain malicious instructions aimed at hijacking agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read the
references/cases.mdfile, which contains numerous URLs to external domains includinggoodcase.aianddouyin.com. - Capability inventory: The workflow explicitly directs the agent to 'Inspect the anchor's finished media with an available image, video, or browser tool' to analyze the external content at runtime.
- Boundary markers: Although the skill requires a 'Preserve/Replace/Avoid' reference contract, there are no technical delimiters or security boundaries to prevent instructions embedded in the fetched media or web pages from being obeyed by the agent.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the content retrieved via browser or media inspection tools before it is interpolated into the artifact generation process.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's operation depends on interacting with external domains that are not part of the standard whitelisted registries.
- URL References: The
references/cases.mdfile contains multiple links togoodcase.ai,media.goodcase.ai, anddouyin.comused as primary evidence. - Dynamic Fetching: The instructions encourage the agent to perform network operations to fetch and inspect data from these external sites during every invocation.
Audit Metadata