skills/lebsral/dspy-programming-not-prompting-lms-skills/ai-stopping-hallucinations/Gen Agent Trust Hub
ai-stopping-hallucinations
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process external, untrusted data such as meeting transcripts and help documentation, which creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill includes functions in
SKILL.mdandexamples.md(e.g.,load_vtt,load_livekit_transcript,load_recall_transcript) that read external file content into the agent's context. - Boundary markers: The implementation uses
dspy.Signatureclasses to provide structured input/output fields, which helps separate context from questions, though it lacks explicit adversarial instruction filtering. - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
dspyfor LLM calls and local file reading via Python'sopen()function. No file-writing or network exfiltration capabilities are present in the provided code. - Sanitization: While it does not sanitize for malicious instructions, the skill specifically implements 'faithfulness verification' as a security control to prevent the AI from generating unsupported claims.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of external Python libraries
dspyandlangfuse. It also suggests downloading additional modular components from the same author's repository using thenpx skills addcommand. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation provides command-line instructions for the user to manage and install related skills using a platform-specific skill management utility (
npx skills).
Audit Metadata