aif-improve
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface because it ingests and processes untrusted data from the codebase, existing plans, and user-provided prompts to generate or modify executable implementation tasks.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads project source files (Step 3), implementation plans (Step 2.1), and architecture/roadmap documents (Step 2.2). It also accepts an optional improvement prompt via
$ARGUMENTS. - Boundary markers: The validation subagent defined in
references/VALIDATOR.mduses simple placeholders ({{PROJECT_CONTEXT}},{{ITEMS}}) to interpolate potentially attacker-controlled content without using high-assurance delimiters or explicit instructions to the subagent to ignore embedded commands within that specific data. - Capability inventory: The skill has powerful capabilities including
WriteandEditfor file modification, andTaskCreate/TaskUpdatefor modifying the agent's pending task list. A successful injection could theoretically leverage these to introduce malicious tasks or modify project code. - Sanitization: No specific escaping, filtering, or sanitization logic for the external content was found before it is processed or passed to subagents.
Audit Metadata