aif-skill-generator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The 'Learn Mode' feature ingests content from external URLs to generate new skill instructions.
- Ingestion points: URLs provided as arguments in
references/LEARN-MODE.mdwhich are fetched viaWebFetch. - Boundary markers (absent): The fetch prompt does not explicitly define delimiters to isolate external content during the initial extraction phase.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
Bash(for installation/removal) andWrite(for generating skill files). - Sanitization (present): The skill implements a mandatory 'AUTO-SCAN' workflow (in
SKILL.mdandreferences/LEARN-MODE.md) that runs the security scanner on the generated skill to detect any leaked malicious instructions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runandBashto execute internal utility scripts. - Evidence:
scripts/cleanup-blocked-skill.pyusessubprocess.runto callnpx skills remove. The input skill name is validated to prevent command injection. - Evidence:
SKILL.mddefines workflows for runningsecurity-scan.pyandvalidate.shviaBashcommands. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill connects to external domains for search and learning functionality.
- Evidence:
scripts/search-skills.pymakes HTTP requests toskills.shto retrieve skill data. - Evidence:
Learn Modefetches documentation from user-supplied URLs usingWebFetch. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documentation and scanning scripts contain numerous prompt injection patterns (e.g., 'ignore previous instructions', 'do not tell the user').
- Evidence: These patterns are located in
scripts/security-scan.pyas regex detection rules and inreferences/SECURITY-SCANNING.mdas documentation examples. They are part of the skill's security logic rather than malicious attempts to override behavior.
Audit Metadata