skills/leeguooooo/zentao-mcp/zentao/Gen Agent Trust Hub

zentao

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 30, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes the zentao CLI tool to perform various operations on the ZenTao project management platform, including creating, listing, and updating records.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill installs the @leeguoo/zentao-mcp package from the NPM registry and fetches skill configurations from the leeguooooo/zentao-mcp GitHub repository. There is a naming discrepancy between the GitHub account ('leeguooooo') and the NPM scope ('@leeguoo').
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill provides a self-update command (zentao self-update) that allows the CLI tool to download and execute updates for itself at runtime.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The documentation and capability map suggest passing sensitive ZenTao passwords directly as command-line arguments using the --zentao-password flag. This practice can expose secrets in process monitoring tools, shell history, or logs.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill reads untrusted content from the ZenTao platform, such as bug titles, task descriptions, and documentation, which could potentially contain malicious instructions intended to influence the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Data is ingested via commands like zentao bugs list, zentao task get, and zentao docs get (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not implement explicit delimiters or boundary markers when presenting external data to the agent context.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive write capabilities, including the ability to resolve bugs, close tasks, and update project metadata.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or content validation for the ingested ZenTao data is specified.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 30, 2026, 05:25 AM