zentao
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes the
zentaoCLI tool to perform various operations on the ZenTao project management platform, including creating, listing, and updating records. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill installs the
@leeguoo/zentao-mcppackage from the NPM registry and fetches skill configurations from theleeguooooo/zentao-mcpGitHub repository. There is a naming discrepancy between the GitHub account ('leeguooooo') and the NPM scope ('@leeguoo'). - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill provides a
self-updatecommand (zentao self-update) that allows the CLI tool to download and execute updates for itself at runtime. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The documentation and capability map suggest passing sensitive ZenTao passwords directly as command-line arguments using the
--zentao-passwordflag. This practice can expose secrets in process monitoring tools, shell history, or logs. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill reads untrusted content from the ZenTao platform, such as bug titles, task descriptions, and documentation, which could potentially contain malicious instructions intended to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested via commands like
zentao bugs list,zentao task get, andzentao docs get(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement explicit delimiters or boundary markers when presenting external data to the agent context.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive write capabilities, including the ability to resolve bugs, close tasks, and update project metadata.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or content validation for the ingested ZenTao data is specified.
Audit Metadata