skills/leek/agent-skills/autopilot/Gen Agent Trust Hub

autopilot

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 3, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/lib/provider.sh defines functions such as run_claude_provider, run_codex_provider, and run_grok_provider that execute external AI agent binaries (claude, codex, grok) as subprocesses to perform autonomous coding and decision-making tasks.\n- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill implements a 'Fresh-process contract' designed for headless operation, which explicitly bypasses standard security guardrails. As evidenced in scripts/lib/provider.sh, the skill launches sub-agents with flags including --dangerously-skip-permissions, --dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox, and --always-approve. These flags disable user-in-the-loop approvals and sandbox restrictions, granting the automated agent significant autonomy on the host system.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses system-level and user-level configuration files to resolve operational parameters. The claude_configured_value function in scripts/lib/provider.sh reads from sensitive paths including /etc/claude-code/managed-settings.json and hidden directories in the user's home folder (e.g., ~/.claude/settings.json), which may contain sensitive configuration data.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its processing of untrusted repository data while safety filters are disabled.\n
  • Ingestion points: Markdown files within the target Git repository, such as tickets, specifications, and maps, are parsed by functions in scripts/lib/tickets.sh. The references/worker.md file also instructs agents to read project-specific rules like AGENTS.md and CLAUDE.md from the repository root.\n
  • Boundary markers: The build_prompt function in scripts/lib/runner.sh interpolates iteration context and workflow paths into the sub-agent's prompt without providing strong delimiters to distinguish instructions from repository data.\n
  • Capability inventory: The sub-agent possesses the capability to modify the file system, execute arbitrary shell commands via the provider binaries, and perform Git operations.\n
  • Sanitization: While logging utilities in scripts/lib/output.sh truncate and sanitize text for display, the untrusted content from the repository is passed directly into the AI agent's operational context.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 3, 2026, 03:18 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — autopilot