autopilot
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/lib/provider.shdefines functions such asrun_claude_provider,run_codex_provider, andrun_grok_providerthat execute external AI agent binaries (claude,codex,grok) as subprocesses to perform autonomous coding and decision-making tasks.\n- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill implements a 'Fresh-process contract' designed for headless operation, which explicitly bypasses standard security guardrails. As evidenced inscripts/lib/provider.sh, the skill launches sub-agents with flags including--dangerously-skip-permissions,--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox, and--always-approve. These flags disable user-in-the-loop approvals and sandbox restrictions, granting the automated agent significant autonomy on the host system.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses system-level and user-level configuration files to resolve operational parameters. Theclaude_configured_valuefunction inscripts/lib/provider.shreads from sensitive paths including/etc/claude-code/managed-settings.jsonand hidden directories in the user's home folder (e.g.,~/.claude/settings.json), which may contain sensitive configuration data.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its processing of untrusted repository data while safety filters are disabled.\n - Ingestion points: Markdown files within the target Git repository, such as tickets, specifications, and maps, are parsed by functions in
scripts/lib/tickets.sh. Thereferences/worker.mdfile also instructs agents to read project-specific rules likeAGENTS.mdandCLAUDE.mdfrom the repository root.\n - Boundary markers: The
build_promptfunction inscripts/lib/runner.shinterpolates iteration context and workflow paths into the sub-agent's prompt without providing strong delimiters to distinguish instructions from repository data.\n - Capability inventory: The sub-agent possesses the capability to modify the file system, execute arbitrary shell commands via the provider binaries, and perform Git operations.\n
- Sanitization: While logging utilities in
scripts/lib/output.shtruncate and sanitize text for display, the untrusted content from the repository is passed directly into the AI agent's operational context.
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