distill-sessions
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive local directories containing session transcripts, specifically
~/.claude/projects/and~/.codex/sessions/. These logs contain interaction history, source code, and terminal output which may include sensitive information. The skill includes a mandatory redaction step to mitigate the exposure of secrets and API keys. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing shell pipelines involving
find,xargs,stat,perl,jq, andawkto filter and format log data. These commands interact directly with the local file system and process data extracted from logs. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from previous session logs. If a past session recorded malicious content (e.g., an attacker-controlled file containing instructions), those instructions could be re-injected into the agent's context during the distillation process.
- Ingestion points: Reads from
~/.claude/projects/*.jsonland~/.codex/sessions/*.jsonlin Step 1 and 2. - Boundary markers: Not explicitly defined for the subagent prompts processing the log batches.
- Capability inventory: Ability to read files via
jq, execute shell formatting viaperl/awk, and generate suggested improvements for the user. - Sanitization: Implements mandatory redaction for secrets (Step 5) and uses structured field extraction via
jqrather than full file ingestion.
Audit Metadata