research
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: As the skill is designed to fetch and process external documentation and package sources, it naturally possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection from untrusted web content.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through the
WebFetch,WebSearch, andsearch-docstools, as well as by reading local package directories likevendor/andnode_modules/inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not provide specific delimiters or instructions to ignore potential commands embedded in the external content being researched.
- Capability inventory: The skill is capable of performing network search and fetch operations and writing findings to the local file system (e.g., in
.scratch/research/). - Sanitization: There are no mentions of sanitizing or escaping the content retrieved from primary sources before it is interpreted by the agent.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses local package directories to gather facts.
- It is instructed to read
vendor/for Composer ornode_modules/for npm to investigate package sources and specifications. - This behavior is restricted to codebase metadata and is consistent with the skill's primary research purpose.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses specific command-like strings for internal routing (e.g.,
/grill-me,/wayfinder,/to-spec). - These appear to be internal platform instructions for sub-agent coordination rather than shell commands.
Audit Metadata