skills/leek/agent-skills/triage/Gen Agent Trust Hub

triage

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions explicitly direct the agent to verify external pull requests by checking out the code and running "relevant tests or commands". Because the skill specifically targets external (non-collaborator) pull requests, this pattern constitutes the execution of untrusted code from a remote source.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions require the agent to "run the relevant tests or commands" for PR verification and to "reproduce [a bug] from the reporter's steps." This allows an external party to provide arbitrary commands that the agent is instructed to execute directly in the environment.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process untrusted data from external sources and use it to drive high-capability actions.
  • Ingestion points: External pull request diffs and markdown issue files located in the .scratch/ directory (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific delimiters or warnings to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded within the untrusted PR diffs or bug reports.
  • Capability inventory: The agent is authorized to execute shell commands, check out code diffs, and perform file system writes (updating GLOSSARY.md, ADRs, and triage notes).
  • Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or validating the content of the pull request or the reproduction steps before they are executed.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Oct 7, 2026, 12:01 PM